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I 
The central claim of this paper is that On Certainty (1969) 
is not to be seen as a “work” of Wittgenstein, but as an 
assemblage from the enormous collection of material that 
constitutes the Nachlass (cf. Stern 1996; Ackermann 1998; 
Hintikka 1991). To substantiate this assertion, I will 
critically compare the publication to its sources, namely 
manuscripts 172, 174, 175, 176 and 177 of the Nachlass. I 
will trace and value the decisions G.E.M. Anscombe and 
G.H. von Wright have made in gathering this collection. 
Their claim is twofold: first, Wittgenstein “marked it [On 
Certainty] off in his notebooks as a separate topic”, and 
second “it constitutes a single sustained treatment of the 
topic” (Wittgenstein 1969, Preface). I will show that the first 
claim is incorrect: not only are Wittgenstein’s “marks” 
ambiguous, but the editors applied their own demarcations 
in these notebooks as well. Their second claim is in need 
of amplification. Wittgenstein’s concern with epistemologi-
cal issues is not limited to these five manuscripts: other 
notebooks of the same period also contain entries that 
strongly relate to topics discussed in On Certainty. I will 
discuss examples from the undated notebooks MSS 169, 
170 and 171, published in Last Writings on the Philosophy 
of Psychology, Vol. II: The “Inner” and the “Outer” (1992). 
These show that it is difficult to make strict divisions in the 
Nachlass in general, and in the late writings of the years 
1949-1951 in particular. In addition, I will diverge from two 
editorial claims regarding the nature and dating of these 
three manuscripts and I propose an alternative one. 
I believe that we may benefit from tracing and assessing 
the editorial choices in two ways. First, hitherto neglected 
connections between different manuscripts and themes will 
come to focus. Wittgenstein’s mapping of epistemological 
concepts for example turns out to be strongly allied to his 
analysis of the relation between mental states and bodily 
behavior. Second, a search for such connections at the 
same time forces us to pay attention to the historical 
development of Wittgenstein’s thoughts. Wittgenstein has 
written on the same topic at different periods of time, and 
the significance of remarks is completely different due to 
different contexts in which these remarks appear. 
II  
On Certainty derives from four different notebooks and a 
bundle of loose sheets. The source of the first section (§§ 
1-65) is MS 172, a manuscript of 24 loose pages. The last 
five pages are printed as part II of Remarks on Color 
(1977). A remark on belief in miracles, originally placed 
between § 64 and § 65 of On Certainty, has not appeared 
in print. The whole manuscript is undated: Anscombe 
assumes that Wittgenstein wrote these remarks between 
December 1949 and March 1950.  
Strikingly, Wittgenstein does not clearly separate the 
section “on certainty” from the section “on colors”; § 65 at 
page 20 in the original manuscript is followed by one other 
remark, and Wittgenstein hereafter immediately continues 
- without drawing any line – with remarks on Goethe’s 
phenomenological analysis of colors. Moreover, at the end 
of the On Certainty section Wittgenstein draws lines 
between every single remark, that is, between §§ 60-66. I 
believe these subsequent lines indicate that Wittgenstein 
does not draw lines merely to mark a change of topic. 
Possibly the lines between §§ 60-66 signify the importance 
Wittgenstein attached to each of these remarks, yet it is 
equally probable that they have no particular purpose at 
all. The editors’ grouping of remarks based on such lines 
seems therefore arbitrary. It may seem trivial to talk about 
lines that Wittgenstein did or did not draw. However, such 
observations do reveal to what extent the grouping of 
remarks is based on editorial decisions - and not so much 
on Wittgenstein’s own clustering or separation of notes. 
§§ 66-192 of On Certainty derive from a notebook of 40 
pages (MS 174), a manuscript that contains only one date 
at page 2r, namely April 24th 1950. At page 14v Wittgen-
stein draws a line; with the exception of a few remarks - 
printed in Culture and Value (1980) -, the notes preceding 
this line are published in Last Writings Vol. II, and the 
subsequent notes are printed as the second section of On 
Certainty.  
A large notebook of 79 pages (MS 175) is the source of 
the whole third section of On Certainty (§§ 193-425). This 
manuscript contains several dates, the first at page 33r - 
September 23rd 1950 - and the last - March 21st 1951 - at 
page 74v. The editors omitted one remark, written at 
March 10th. 
The first cluster of remarks in MS 176 is undated and 
printed as Part I of Remarks on Color. At page 22r we find 
the date March 21st 1951. After this date follow remarks 
426-523 of On Certainty. Wittgenstein draws no line 
between these sections. Subsequently, at page 46v, 
Wittgenstein does draw a line, and the eleven pages that 
follow are printed in LW, Vol. II. Then, at page 51v of MS 
176, we find § 524 of On Certainty, and the notebook 
continues up to § 637 of the published work. The last date 
is April 24th 1951. Considering the amount of text it is 
unlikely that Wittgenstein wrote the last nine pages of MS 
175 and the first 22 of MS 176 all on March 21st; it is 
possible that Wittgenstein wrote the first section in a 
completely different period. Possibly this gap in chronology 
motivated the editors to publish both parts in different 
editions, yet Wittgenstein does not segregate these two 
sections. 
The last section of On Certainty (§§ 638-676) is written 
in a small notebook (MS 177), the first remarks of which 
are dated April 25th 1951. The last remarks, dated April 
27th 1951, are written two days before Wittgenstein’s 
death. 
The above survey of the content of these five notebooks 
shows that On Certainty is a rather diffuse editorial 
compilation of notes that derive from five different 
manuscripts written over a period of approximately 17 
months. Surely the choices of the editors are not unrea-
sonable or illogical. However, Wittgenstein did not 
unmistakably mark off these sections in his notebooks. In 
MS 172 Wittgenstein draws several lines the purpose of 
which is far from clear. The presumed function of such 
lines as marks of demarcation is therefore doubtful. 
Furthermore, in manuscripts 172 and 176 the editors 
applied their own, alternately thematically or chronologi-
cally orientated, demarcation marks. The preface to On 
Certainty does not mention editorial decisions such as 




these: Anscombe and von Wright suggest that Wittgen-
stein conceived of these four sections as a separate piece 
of work. This claim is, I believe, incorrect. 
III 
I will qualify the second claim regarding On Certainty - that 
it constitutes a single sustained treatment of the topic -, 
indirectly, by first discussing the editorial claims that are 
made regarding three undated manuscripts – MSS 169, 
170 & 171 -, which are published in Last Writings Vol. II. In 
their preface to this edition, G.H. von Wright and H. Nyman 
assert that MS 169 “was probably already begun in late 
fall, 1948, or in the spring of 1949”. They also claim that 
this notebook is of the nature of preliminary studies for 
MSS 137-138. Wittgenstein composed these two manu-
scripts between 2 February 1949 and 20 May 1949. The 
second half of 137 and the entirety of 138 are published as 
Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. I 
(1982). The small notebooks MS 170 and MS 171 – 19 
pages in all – are, according to von Wright and Nyman, 
chronologically probably closely connected to MS 169 and 
possibly written in 1949. 
In my view, both claims regarding MS 169 are incorrect: 
I believe that MS 169 is written not sooner than the 
summer of 1949. This implies that MS 169 cannot be 
regarded as preliminary studies for MSS 137 & 138, 
manuscripts that Wittgenstein wrote earlier. The claim 
regarding MSS 170 & 171 needs qualification: in my view 
these manuscripts are, like MS 169, written in the summer 
of 1949, or shortly after.  
Evidence for this position lies in the relation between a 
series of conversations that Wittgenstein held with Norman 
Malcolm in the summer of 1949, and the content of all 
three manuscripts. Wittgenstein set sail to America in July 
1949, and he stayed with Malcolm for nearly three months. 
Malcolm gives an account of their conversations in his 
Memoir (1958). At the time Wittgenstein visited him, 
Malcolm had just written an article (Malcolm 1949) in which 
he criticizes G.E. Moore’s ideas as formulated in “Defence 
of Common Sense” (1925) and “Proof of an External 
World” (1939). Malcolm’s criticism was the main subject of 
discussion. 
A first theme discussed by both philosophers is Moore’s 
use of “ I know” in for example his statement “ I know that 
here is one hand, and here is another” (Moore 1959, 146). 
Moore is misusing language, says Malcolm. His use of “ I 
know” is contrary to the ordinary and correct use of this 
expression. Wittgenstein is less forthright about the idea 
that Moore misuses language. Rather than declaring that it 
is a misuse of language to say “I know that this is a hand”, 
Wittgenstein prefers to say that it has no clear meaning, 
“and that Moore himself doesn’t know how he is using it” 
(Malcolm 1958, 89). 
Notes in MS 171 concern the same topic. On Moore’s 
use of “ I know” Wittgenstein remarks: “Wenn Moore es 
gebraucht, so ist es, als wollte er sagen: ‘Die Philosophen 
sagen immer, man könnte das Gefühl des Wissens nur in 
dem und dem Fall haben, ich aber habe es auch in diesem 
und diesem und diesem Fall’. Er schaut auf die Hand, gibt 
sich das Gefühl des Wissens und sagt nun, er habe es” 
(MS 171, 9-10).  
In this manuscript Wittgenstein further comments upon 
another example that he elaborately discussed with 
Malcolm. It concerns the use of “I know” in an expression 
such as “I know that this is a tree”. The case derives from 
a discussion between Malcolm and Moore: while sitting in 
the garden of Moore’s house, Moore would give an 
example of something he knows for certain, and he “would 
point at a tree a few feet away, and say, with peculiar 
emphasis, ‘I know that that’s a tree’. He would then claim 
that he had just made an assertion that was perfectly 
meaningful (as well as true)” (Malcolm 1976, 173). Witt-
genstein writes: “Es ist wahr, daß [Moore] weiß, daß dies 
ein Baum ist, dies zeigt sich in seinem ganzen Benehmen. 
Daraus folgt nicht, daß er beim Philosophieren die Worte 
”Ich weiß [...| etc.]” nicht mißversteht” (MS 171, 12). 
Wittgenstein subscribes to Malcolm’s idea that Moore’s 
peculiar emphasis upon ‘I know that that’s a tree’ will not 
refute a skeptical philosopher who denies that we can ever 
know with certainty the truth of an empirical proposition like 
“This is a tree” or “The house is on fire”. Moore, says 
Wittgenstein, wants to exhibit knowing for certain to 
himself, i.e. he wants to produce in himself the feeling of 
knowledge, which is to counter the skeptic’s claim that we 
can never have absolute certain knowledge. However, 
says Wittgenstein, this “feeling of knowing” is irrelevant, 
since we are not dealing with a psychological but a logical 
issue. And this means that we have to show the septic 
“that there is a point at which there is neither any ‘making 
more certain’ nor any ‘turning out to be false’” (Malcolm 
1958, 91). Note that Wittgenstein draws several lines in 
this manuscript. The editors have chosen not to interpret 
them as lines of demarcation this time. 
At the end of MS 169 Wittgenstein expresses the 
absurdity of Moore’s expression “I know that this is a tree” 
as follows: “’I know that this is the earth’ – saying which I 
stamp my foot on the ground” (Wittgenstein 1992, 46). The 
irony is obvious. This section of the manuscript contains 
several remarks on the use of “I know”. As Malcolm 
recalls, according to Wittgenstein there is an ordinary use 
of “I know” when there is not any making sure. For 
example, a blind man might ask “Are you sure that it is a 
tree?” A sighted person could reply “I know it is a tree”. 
This, says Wittgenstein, would be a case of certainty “in 
the highest degree” (Malcolm 1958, 89-90): I should be 
willing to count nothing as evidence that there is not a tree 
there.  
The same point is expressed in MS 169. If someone 
reports a well-known fact to us, e.g. that that is the 
Schneeberg, we may say “I know that it is the Schnee-
berg”, meaning that it is not subject to any doubt at all” 
(Wittgenstein 1992, 45). This is an example of the use of “I 
know” “in which that expression really functions ‘im 
sprachlichen verkehr’” (Malcolm 1958, 90). Yet Moore, 
says Wittgenstein, does not give such examples: “Moore’s 
sentence was a practical one left indeterminate” (Wittgen-
stein 1992, 44).  
Next to Moore’s use of the expression “I know”, Malcolm 
and Wittgenstein talk about the meaning of Moorean 
truisms such as “There exists at present a living human 
body, which is my body”; “The earth existed for a long time 
before my birth”; “My body has never been far from the 
surface of the earth”; “I am a human being” (Moore 1959, 
33-34). Wittgenstein finds it difficult to think of a usage for 
“I know that the earth has existed for many years”, and 
remarks that if we cannot think of a use for the sentence, 
“then we do not understand it at all” (Malcolm 1958, 90). 
MS 170 contains the earliest entries that are related to 
Moore’s truism on the existence of the earth. If someone 
would ask us whether the earth really had existed before 
our birth, our response, says Wittgenstein, will be “of 
course it had”. A doubt here “ist unmöglich” (MS 170, 5r). 
He adds that we would be slightly annoyed and timid, 
since we would be conscious of the fact that “wir einerseits 
gar nicht im Stande sind Gründe dafür anzugeben, weil es 




scheinbar zu viele dafür gibt, und anderseits, daß ein 
Zweifel unmöglich ist, und man dem Fragenden gar nicht 
durch eine besondere Belehrung antworten kann sondern 
indem man ihm nach und nach ein Bild unserer Welt 
beibringt” (MS 170, 5). Again, Wittgenstein draws a line in 
this manuscript that the editors ignore.  
IV 
The similarities between the content of the three undated 
notebooks MSS 169, 179 & 171 and Malcolm’s Memoir, 
lend plausibility to the view that Wittgenstein wrote MSS 
170 & 171, and at least the latter part of MS 169, during or 
shortly after his stay in America. This means that their 
dating should be adjusted: in contrast to editorial sugges-
tions, these manuscripts are not written at the end of 1948 
or at the beginning of 1949, but in the summer of 1949 or 
shortly after. Consequently, MS 169 cannot be regarded 
as preliminary studies for MSS 137-138.  
There is additional evidence for this last proposal (cf. 
Pichler 1994, 138-139). The beginning of MS 169 has the 
character of a summary: Wittgenstein omits the greater 
part of a remark and replaces it with a line. The complete 
remark comes from MS 137, MS 138, MS 144 or TS 234 – 
sometimes a remark is found in two or three of these 
items. Wittgenstein apparently extracted remarks from 
these four manuscripts for MS 169. Consequently, the 
view that MS 169 is preliminary to MSS 137-138 loses its 
plausibility. It is commonly held that Wittgenstein prepared 
TS 234 - printed as Part II of the Investigations - in June or 
July 1949, before he went to America, and that MS 144, 
the source for this typescript, is composed earlier that 
same year. It is more than likely, then, that MS 169 was 
written later than MS 144 or TS 234. 
In his Nachlass studies, M. Nedo surmises that Wittgen-
stein wrote and dictated MS 169, MS 144 and TS 234 in 
the fall of 1949 (Nedo 1993, 46). There is too many 
evidence to the contrary: in a letter to Malcolm of 18 
February 1949 Wittgenstein writes that he intends to 
“dictate the stuff that I have been writing since last autumn” 
(Malcolm 1958, 81). This intention is repeated in a letter 
written at 4 June. Anscombe recalls that Wittgenstein 
dictated TS 234 at the end of June or beginning of July 
1949, while Wittgenstein stayed at von Wright’s house in 
Cambridge (von Wright 1992, 185-186). Monk expresses 
the same view (Monk 1990, 542-544). Surprisingly, there 
are reasons to assume that Wittgenstein did not bring TS 
234 with him when traveling to America. In an earlier letter 
to Malcolm, Wittgenstein expresses his intention to send 
Malcolm a copy of his work. This Wittgenstein did not do, 
yet, as Malcolm recalls, Wittgenstein had with him a copy 
of the writings he referred to in his letter, material that is 
“incorporated in Part II of the Investigations” (Malcolm 
1958, 81). It is likely that Wittgenstein brought a copy of 
MS 144: according to Rush Rhees there existed a second 
copy of MS 144, in addition to the top copy. This second 
copy has been lost in the meantime (von Wright 1992, 
182). Possibly Wittgenstein did not discuss TS 234 with 
Malcolm, but rather MS 144. This may seem a bit odd 
considering the fact that Wittgenstein had already shifted 
and rearranged this material. However, it must remain an 
assumption that it was a copy of this manuscript that Witt-
genstein had with him. 
Of what importance are the previous observations for On 
Certainty? The examples in MSS 169, 170 & 171 show, I 
believe, that Wittgenstein’s concern with epistemological 
concepts is not limited to MSS 172, 174, 175, 176 and 
177: other manuscripts of the same period contain notes 
on related issues. Moreover, there are several earlier 
manuscripts that contain reflections on the same topics, 
like MS 137, MS 138 and, most importantly, MS 119, a 
manuscript written in 1937, partly published as “On Cause 
and Effect” (1976). Clearly, the Nachlass contains 
numerous - scattered - sections on epistemology: 
apparently Wittgenstein felt the need to write on the topic 
in many different contexts, which points out that these 
issues may be of more importance to Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy than is often assumed. Studying these remarks 
enables us to trace the development of Wittgenstein’s 
thoughts on these matters. In turn, such an overview 
points to connections that exist between Wittgenstein’s 
thoughts on epistemology and his reflections on the 
philosophy of psychology. This, however, is a matter of 
future research.  
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